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Asian bond issues in Tokyo: 
history, structure and prospects  
Fumiaki Nishi and Alexander Vergus 
Overview of Tokyo’s capital market 
This paper outlines the contribution made by the Japanese capital market to international 
and in particular Asian bond finance. Drawing on one of the major global pools of savings, 
the Japanese capital market has provided funding opportunities, both in debt and equity, for 
international entities including sovereigns, government agencies, corporations and other 
financing vehicles. 
During the last several decades, Japanese money has played an important role in the 
international capital markets. For example, during the 1980s, the movement of Japanese 
money exerted crucial influence over the performance of US Treasuries, and all market 
participants carefully monitored Japanese investors’ policy. In the area of primary markets, 
Japanese securities firms monopolised the top positions in international bond underwriting 
league tables for a considerable time. 
However, with the burst of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, the relative importance of 
Japanese money and capital markets started to decline. Japanese money retreated home, 
where domestic government debt issuance increased dramatically in the 1990s. As a result, 
the share of the yen has also been declining in international bond issuance. At the peak, 
yen-denominated bonds accounted for about 17% of total international bond issuance, but 
decreased to less than 2% last year. 
However, Japan still has a huge capital market with abundant investor liquidity, so that with 
right products capturing market trends there should be ample opportunities to mobilise 
Japanese money for international financing. An example is the recent shift of investor 
preferences from credit/spread instruments to foreign currencies and equity risk, following 
the credit events of late 1990s. 
Brief historical background 
During late 1960s, Japanese foreign currency reserves started to grow and pressure to open 
up the market and revalue the yen began to intensify. The exchange rate of the yen at that 
time was fixed at 360 yen per US dollar. It was revalued to 308 yen in 1971 and moved to a 
floating rate system in February 1973. 
In order to divert the foreign exchange pressure, the Japanese government set out around 
that time to open the Japanese capital market to foreign entities, allowing them to issue 
yen-denominated bonds.  
Japanese foreign currency denominated bond investment started at the same time. In 1970 
the first “Samurai” - a yen-denominated bond publicly offered by an international borrower in 
the domestic market - was issued by the Asian Development Bank. 
Development of the Samurai market was followed by liberalisation of euroyen issuance, with 
the first euroyen bond issue made by the European Investment Bank in 1977. Both 
developments were aimed at reducing pressure for appreciation of the yen as well as at 
liberalising the Japanese capital market. However, both the Samurai and the euroyen market 144  BIS Papers No 30
 
started off under strict government control and there were detailed guidelines on issuer 
eligibility, bond structure and issuance amounts. 
Such controls were gradually eased, attracting a wider range of market participants, and 
eventually leading to full liberalisation of both markets. 
The next section is devoted to the current Japanese bond market and its development, 
focusing on how Asian and other foreign entities have been using the Japanese market 
through Samurai and Euroyen bond issuance. 
Japan’s domestic bond market 
In the present-day Japanese bond market, government debt accounts for the lion’s share 
both in terms of primary issuance and secondary turnover. As can be seen from Chart 1, 
government bond issuance started to surge in the mid-1980s as fiscal policy was deployed in 
order to stimulate the economy, reaching nearly 80% of all bond issuance in 2003. 
Chart 1 
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Note: 2004 data are estimated. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
In particular, after the bubble burst at the beginning of the 1990s, Japan government bond 
issuance accelerated, reaching an estimated 36.4 trillion yen of new bond issuance in 
FY2003 and bringing the outstanding volume to approximately 500 trillion yen, or an 
estimated 140% of GDP, at the end of FY2003. 
Development of the corporate bond market in Japan has been a slow process, due mainly to 
the strong influence of commercial banks interested in preserving the importance of lending 
as the main channel for corporate financing. However, during the last decade, with banks 
weakened by non-performing loans, corporate bond issuance has been increasing.  
For a number of reasons related to events in Japan and internationally, the bulk of the 
international yen bond market is currently taken by euroyen issuance, with the Samurai 
market carving out only a very small share, as can be seen in the breakdown of new 
issuance presented in Chart 2 below. BIS Papers No 30  145
 
Chart 2 














Source: Bank of Japan. 
 
The rather conservative Japanese individual investor portfolio constrains the development of 
Japan’s bond market. Household financial assets numbering 1,400 trillion yen 
(US$  13  trillion) are for the most part held in cash and bank deposits, complemented by 
significant insurance and pension policy claims, leaving only a relatively small portion of the 
market for direct securities purchases by Japanese households (Chart 3). 
Chart 3 
Japanese household financial assets, 
breakdown and investment channels 

























Source: Bank of Japan. 
At present, current deposits enjoy unlimited government guarantees in case of bank failure; 
however, the introduction of a ceiling on such guarantees (10 million yen per depositor per 
bank), ie the so-called pay-off system, is planned to take effect in April 2005, and is expected 
to cause significant movement of retail money out of deposits into other financial instruments. 146  BIS Papers No 30
 
Therefore, current major investors in the Japanese capital market are the banking and 
insurance sectors, against the backdrop of risk-averse household saving behaviour. Banks 
and insurers had traditionally channelled funds to the ever-expanding corporate sector; 
however, slowing economic growth in the mid-1980s created industrial overcapacity and the 
consequent shrinking of domestic demand for loans. Excessive property investments 
followed, creating Japan’s notorious bubble economy of the second half of the 1980s. The 
burst of the bubble in 1989-1990 has left a legacy of bad loans and huge loss of savings 
value, the consequences of which Japan is still dealing with. 
As can be seen in Chart 4, as a result of these trends, Japanese banks had to cope with a 
continuously widening gap between liabilities (deposits) and assets (lending), causing them 
to dramatically increase their bond holdings. To a lesser extent, the same applied to the 
insurance sector. Recent bond holding trends by major investors are shown in Chart 5 below. 
Chart 4 
Asset-liability mismatch of the banking system 
 




Source: Bank of Japan. 
Increased inflow of funds into the bond markets has tended to push down interest rates in 
Japan since the peak of 1989. As can be seen in Chart 6, while reacting to political and other 
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factors, interest rates had followed a long-term falling trend, until finally hitting bottom in June 
2003, and jumping since then back to the levels of around 2001. In another unique 
development, as shown in Chart 6, spreads between banking interest rate swap contracts 
and government bond yields also virtually disappeared around 2001, as markets attached 
the same risk as the government to the banking system enjoying the government’s umbrella 
guarantee. Interest rates still remain at very low levels which are expected to persist as long 
as the Bank of Japan maintains zero short-term interest rates in a recovering economy that 
still suffers from deflation. 
Chart 6 
Government bond yields and yen IRS rates 
















The Samurai bond market 
As can be seen in Chart 6, the amount of Samurai bond issuance accounted for a very small 
share of issuance in 2003 - only 0.3%.  
As we have mentioned above, the Samurai market was set up under pressure to alleviate the 
external imbalances of the late 1960s, and the inaugural issue was made by the Asian 
Development Bank in November 1970. The issue amount was 6 billion yen with a 7-year 
maturity, and it was accepted very well in the market. 
Initially, high credit issuers such as the ADB or other supranationals were given priority in 
access to the market. In order to control the flow of issuance, eligibility criteria were 
established. 
For issuers unable to satisfy such eligibility criteria, there was another way to finance yen 
through yen-denominated private placement bonds. They were allowed to target a limited 
number of institutional investors, and issuance terms and liquidity were tightly controlled. 
Yen private placement issuance started in 1972; however, with the liberalisation of the 
Samurai and euroyen markets, the raison d’être for private placements diminished, and the 
market shrank and was replaced by other means of targeting a limited circle of investors. 
In the Samurai market, in July 1972 Australia issued the first sovereign bond. The market 
continued to be gradually opened for more issuers through the easing of eligibility criteria and 
the liberalisation of new types of bonds. Complicated eligibility criteria were subsequently 
replaced by requirements for minimum credit ratings and finally abolished. 148  BIS Papers No 30
 
Later on, bond structures were diversified to allow dual currency or reverse dual currency 
bonds, with the principal and interest payment in different currencies, while the issuance of 
floating rate notes and index-linked structures were also liberalised. 
As can be seen in Chart 7 below, the Samurai market developed gradually before peaking in 
1996, and in the course of its development, it helped to liberalise Japanese bond market in 
many ways. 
Chart 7 
Historical Samurai issuance 
 
Source: Nomura. 
Looking at the ratings breakdown of Samurai issuance during its most active period, one can 
perceive the activity of AA borrowers with structured Samurais in 1994-1998 (popular as the 
yen was steadily depreciating after hitting a peak in 1995), while between 1999-2001 the 
market was open mainly for BBB, and more recently mostly for single A, ratings. 
Chart 8 
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Many borrowers have tapped this market, and for several countries the Samurai market was 
at times the most important foreign bond market. Many issues originated from Asian entities. 
Singapore opened the market for Asian sovereigns in 1976, while the Korea Development 
Bank made its debut issue in January 1978, followed by multiple issues by various Korean 
entities. The Asian presence in the Samurai market is shown in Chart 9 and Table 1 below. 
Chart 9 




























































































































































Samurai bonds by Asian issuers, 1970 to date 
  Amount (yen bn)  No of issues 
South Korea    1,461    69 
Australia   1,249    64 
China   941    49 
Malaysia   292    14 
ADB   252    9 
Thailand   215    16 
Hong Kong    148    12 
India   141    6 
Philippines   90    4 
New Zealand    45    2 
Source: Nomura 
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Table 2 
Deregulation of the Samurai market 




1970  Supranational issuance allowed  ADB issues the first Samurai bond    1    6 
1972  Sovereign issuance allowed 
Yen private placements by non-
residents started 
Australia becomes first sovereign 
Samurai issuer, Mexico and Brazil 
debut in 1973   6  85 
1979  Corporate issuance starts  Sears Overseas Finance NV issues 
the first corporate Samurai bond    16    333 
1984  Public issuer rating criteria 
broadened to single A 
Bank of China issues debut Samurai 
 37   915 
1986  Financial parameters and single A 
rating as criteria for private issuers 
Samurai issuance decreases as 
Euroyen issuance is widely 
liberalised   21    590 
1988  Introduction of shelf registration  First issue by Greece, later to 
become one of the largest sovereign 
borrowers   22    635 
1989  First reverse dual currency Samurai 
issue 
Denmark issued the first reverse 
dual Samurai Bond - main forex 
exposure structure to date (currently 
as PRDC)    47   1,126 
1991  Sovereigns broadened to BBB, FRN 
issuance 
First BBB-rated sovereign issue takes 
place in 1994 (Central Bank of Tunisia)    34    681 
1992  Public sector broadened to BBB  Ankara Municipality issues first BBB 
public sector Samurai   53    1,700 
1994  Private sector issuers broadened to 
BBB 
PEMEX issues first BBB rated 
corporate Samurai    55   1,163 
1995  First dual currency Samurai issue  Popularity of dual currency structure 
among retail investors as yen 
depreciates   35    1,115 
1996  Lifting of issuance eligibility criteria, 
but financial institutions remain shut 
from the market 
Brazil issues the first sub-
investment grade bond in the 
Samurai market; market on the way 
to record in 1996   153   3,874 
1996  Foreign non-banks allowed to issue 
for purposes other than lending 
FMCC issues Samurai bond as the 
first non-bank issuer    
1997  Samurai issuance by overseas 
commercial banks liberated 
Citicorp becomes first commercial 
bank to issue a Samurai    85   2,123 
1998  Issuance of Nikkei-linked Samurai 
bonds liberalised 
No issuance so far    14    205 
1999  Foreign non-bankers allowed to 
issue for general finance purposes 
Associates debut in 1999, 
Household  
Finance - 7 issues since 2000    10    661 
2003  Single A and higher rated foreign 
non-sovereigns not listed at TSE 
eligible for shelf registration 
Several corporates have already 
taken advantage of the measure 
 27   641 
1  Excluding private placements. BIS Papers No 30  151
 
Again, as can be seen, the gradual expansion of the market reached a peak in 1996 and was 
arrested by the crisis of 1997, before only partially recovering around 1999, for a less 
diversified range of issuers. There are several reasons for the relatively inactive market. 
There has been criticism as to the rather rigid issue eligibility, the opaque pricing procedure 
brought about by illiquid trading and cumbersome issue procedures. Some of these problems 
have been solved. As can be seen in Table 2, all issuance eligibility criteria have been 
abolished, and almost all the restrictions on types of bonds have been lifted. 
However, there is still some room for improvement. The most important issue is that under 
the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law, in order to make a public offering, the issuer 
has to file a Securities Registration Statement with the Ministry of Finance in Japanese. 
It used to take 30 days for the Securities Registration Statement to become effective, 
hindering flexibility to promptly bring an issue to the market. In order to simplify this 
procedure, the shelf registration system was introduced in 1988 and contributed to significant 
shortening of the issuance timetable. However, there are still requests to shorten the 
procedure as well as - since annual and semi-annual statements have to be filed in 
Japanese - to allow issuers to use English to save both time and costs necessary for 
translation. 
Other practices offering room for improvement include the obsolete registration system, 
whereby holdings by institutions are “recorded” by the paying agent bank, which also serves 
as a “recording agency” for each issue. Retail investors, for their part, still receive expensive 
printed bond certificates. Finally, the commercial law requirement to appoint commissioned 
banks as trustees also increases issuance expenses in comparison to issuance using just 
fiscal agents.  
The euroyen market 
Chart 10 below shows historical volumes of euroyen issuance. 
Chart 10 
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The euroyen market made its appearance in April 1977, with an issue by the European 
Investment Bank. At the initial stage, the market was highly regulated by the government and 
remained very small since at the time Japanese monetary authorities considered that full 
liberalisation of the euroyen market might cause difficulties in conducting its monetary and 
foreign exchange policy.  
In the autumn of 1983, the closed nature of Japan’s financial markets and the yen-dollar 
problem escalated into a political issue. This led to the setting up in 1983 of the Japan-US 
Yen-Dollar Committee, which presented in May 1984 its famous report. 
This report resulted in drastic changes of the government policy. In December 1984, the 
rating requirement was relaxed from AAA to single A, and non-Japanese houses licensed 
under Japanese securities law were allowed to lead manage euroyen bonds. Such 
deregulations accelerated issuance of euroyen bonds, and in 1985 the amount of euroyen 
bond issuance exceeded that of the Samurai market. Also, by June 1987, three Japanese 
rating agencies, in addition to three international rating agencies, were approved as official 
rating agencies. 
In 1987, according to International Finance Review, euroyen issue amount accounted for 
17% of the total euro market issue amount. In June 1989, all eligibility criteria were lifted, 
while in 1994, as the last major liberalisation measure, restrictions on flowback, ie the 
secondary market sale of bonds issued offshore back into the Japanese domestic market, 
were eased, before being fully lifted in 1995. 
Since then, Euroyen issuance, with its relatively easier procedures, became even more 
popular so that nowadays bonds are sometimes issued offshore even when the targeted 
investor base is domestic Japanese investors. Table 3 presents the history of the 
liberalisation of this market. 
The market is now completely free and has established its position as one of the major global 
capital markets. A wide range of issuers utilise this market, including Japanese companies 
seeking funding abroad. 
Other structures: Shoguns, Daimyos, globals and the MTN market 
Originally both the Samurai and euroyen markets started to develop due to “gaiatsu” 
(pressure from foreign countries) but internal efforts have also been made to develop the 
market.   
The “Shogun” - foreign currency denominated bonds issued and sold in the Japanese market 
to provide a domestic instrument for investors interested in purchasing foreign currency 
bonds, was introduced in 1985, with the IBRD as the inaugural issuer. The liquidity of the 
market is very important to make the market attractive for both investors and issuers, and 
efforts to integrate the Japanese market with the international market were subsequently 
undertaken. 
To that end, it was necessary to set up a system to sell and trade bonds not only in the 
Japanese market but also in European and US markets. “Daimyo” bonds, which later 
transformed into “global bonds”, were created based on the above concept. The idea was to 
make registration necessary, to make the bond saleable internationally. At the initial stage, 
supranationals were major issuers as they are exempt from registration requirements in 
Japan and the US. BIS Papers No 30  153
 
Table 3 
Deregulation of the Euroyen Market 
  Issues  Volume (yen bn)  Deregulation Measures 
1977    2    30.0  Euroyen issuance by EIB 
1978-83   22    340.0   
1984    13    227.0  Broad relaxation of guidelines: 
1.  Broadening of issuers from supras and 
governments to municipalities, 
government agencies and private entities 
2.  Relaxation of criteria: for public 
borrowers, from AAA to A; for private, A 
and compliance with Samurai criteria 
3.  Quantitative relaxation: from 6-7 annual to 
no limits on number and amounts of 
issuance 
4.  Limits on lead managers: from domestic 
only to domestic and foreign securities 
houses 
1985    66    1,445.7  New types of instruments allowed: FRN, 
zero-coupon, discount, deep discount and 
currency conversion bonds 
1986   141    2,551.5  Quantitative  criteria for corporates replaced 
with rating only and rating criteria broadened 
to A rated 
No flowback period shortened from 180 to 90 
days 
Japanese rating agencies recognised 
Issuance allowed for banks on condition that 
proceeds would not enter Japan 
1987    151    2,993.9  Tenors shortened from 5 to 4 years 
Fitch recognised as rating agency 
1988   224    2,213.0   
1989    395    3,557.9  Lifting of tenor criteria 
1990   512    4,980.9   
1991    314    3,290.4  IBRD issues first global yen; the issue is 
exempt from flowback limits 
1992   250    3,328.0   
1993    640    5,084.8  Full lifting of issuance criteria 
1994    2,030    10,085.1  Lifting of flowback limitations for sovereign 
issues 
1995    3,015    11,515.6  Lifting of all flowback limitations 
1996   5,345    14,937.4   
1997   5,492    16,952.2   
1998    NA    12,300.0  Under the new Foreign Exchange Law, 
advance approval requirement replaced by 
filing of post-transaction report 154  BIS Papers No 30
 
Global dollar bonds and global yen bonds were issued mainly during the 1990s. However, to 
integrate disclosure requirements, taxation issues and the other administrative requirements 
of all the markets is not easy, and the majority of issuers continued to be supranationals that 
enjoy exemption from registration. As a result, as can be seen in Charts 11-13 below, the 
number of bonds issued has not been that impressive. (We have also presented respective 
issuance lists and an overview chart of different structures in the annexes). 
Chart 11 
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Chart 13 
Historical global yen Issuance 
 
Source: Nomura. 
Other efforts have been made to develop new products to satisfy very liquid but conservative 
domestic investors. Asset-backed securities, index-linked securities and other types of new 
products have been marketed in Japan. But products offering foreign exchange risk and 
equity risk have traditionally been, and still are, the most popular ones. 
Also, many relatively small, tailor-made transactions targeting the specific requirements of 
institutional investors are executed through issuers’ MTN programmes, with numerous small 
MTN transactions adding up to an ample market volume, as presented in Chart 14. Again, 
most issues tend to offer foreign currency exposure through some structure, with the “power 
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The retail market: the Uridashi 
In order to make the domestic public offering of foreign securities possible, in 1994 “Uridashi” 
registration was introduced. Under this registration, bonds denominated in yen or another 
currency and issued overseas can be sold in Japan through a secondary market registration 
and selling contract between a domestic Uridashi agent and an overseas underwriter. 
This registration has enabled securities firms to efficiently satisfy domestic retail demand for 
both foreign currency fixed income and equity-linked products. Some yen straight bond 
issuers have also sometimes opted for a “euroyen with an Uridashi” structure, notably the 
Korea Electric Power Corporation. 
The Uridashi registration most efficiently serves an issuance structure in which a top-rated 
foreign, usually corporate, entity issues a foreign currency straight or structured (including 
equity-linked) instrument. These products normally offer some risk other than the credit risk 
of the issuer, so that issuers are limited to low-risk entities, while the risk offered is that of a 
currency popular among retail investors, or of an equity exposure at times of attractive equity 
market.  
Naturally, in recent years, foreign exchange products have enjoyed massive retail demand 
as Japanese interest rates reached virtually zero. The range of currencies tends to be 
confined to those of the G7 countries. The US dollar recently conceded popularity to the 
Australian dollar, with its high interest rates and the robust performance of the Australian 
economy, the euro on its recent strengthening trend, and, to a lesser degree, the sterling and 
the Canadian dollar (Chart 15). Some other currencies are also carving out a niche in this 
market, most notably the South African rand. 
Chart 15 
Uridashi issuance 2000-2003 
 
Source: Nomura. 
Expansion of this market to Asian currencies is a natural issue at hand, and this will require 
the resolution of a number of market-related, regulatory and technical issues, ie:  
–  First, acceptance by Japanese investors of AAA or AA rated (such as those issued 
by the ADB) bonds denominated in Asian currencies; 
–  Next, opening of the market for Asian local entities issuing in local currencies; this 
will require further improvement of credit stories across the region (the market 
traditionally accepts AAA to AA issuance);  
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–  In the secondary market, Japanese investors’ portfolios of foreign currency bonds 
go through much more trading than those for yen bonds (other than Japan 
government bonds) as investors tend to move to take profits or cut losses at times of 
wide currency movements. Liquidity is therefore important, making the infrastructure 
(ie market capacity, as well as such technical points as clearing and settlement 
systems, hedging and money market tools, etc.) of the bond market of the 
corresponding currency an important issue for the functioning of the market; 
–  The issue of correlation with the dollar may be the last point worth mentioning. As is 
the case with Chinese yuan (renminbi), any prospects of Asian currencies 
decoupling and appreciating versus the G3 group will justify the emergence of a new 
market for these currencies. 
Current issues 
We have outlined above procedural issues still weighing mainly on the Samurai market. 
However, they can and have been easily overcome, should this market be sufficiently 
attractive for borrowers. Much more crucially, there are a number of important market-related 
issues which have been affecting the yen markets in all their facets: 
1.  As Japan’s rating was downgraded to the AA/A category, it became difficult for 
higher rated borrowers to tap the market. Among Japanese investors, it is invariably 
difficult to sell any instrument whose terms are better than those for Japanese 
government bonds. 
2.  Some emerging market sovereigns, as well as some companies hitherto perceived 
as top-grade defaulted or suffered downgrades. Until 2001, sub-investment grade 
issues had been very popular as investors were attracted by their yield pick-up amid 
ever falling domestic interest rates. As a result, the Japanese market is extensively 
exposed to the Argentine problem, with no prospect of resolution in sight, souring 
the current market sentiment toward credit risk. 
3.  However, for some regular, especially Asian, visitors to the Samurai market, their 
domestic liquidity became very high and the requirements for international fund-
raising diminished. In particular, some Asian countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia 
and China, which used to be regular issuers in the Samurai market, have seen their 
international funding requirements drastically reduced. 
4.  As absolute levels of interest rates elsewhere have been “catching up” with low yen 
interest rates, the exchange risk associated with borrowing in yen started to 
outweigh the attractiveness of yen for international borrowers. 
5.  The emergence of the euro as a single currency and of the associated single capital 
market has attracted countries in other regions, in particular EU and EU accession 
countries, to finance in the euro market, taking them further away from alternatives, 
including the yen market. 
6.  As regards Asia, the position of the dollar remains very strong, with many currencies 
pegged to the dollar and foreign reserves also still mainly in dollars. As is widely 
known, recently Asian central banks, together with Japan, have been supporting the 
dollar, adding record amounts of US Treasuries to their foreign reserves in the 
process. It can be observed that not only the yen- but also the euro-denominated 
issuance is also rather limited in the region. 
7.  Another obvious reason for the decline of the yen’s relative importance in the 
international markets is that some Japanese demand has shifted to non-yen 
currencies.  158  BIS Papers No 30
 
This has left international banks and companies, which require yen funding for their 
Japanese domestic operations, as the only consistently present issuer category on the 
Samurai market.  
Among sovereign and government agency issuers, the market is currently confined to those 
with BBB to A ratings, with borrowers from Korea, primarily the KDB, as the most consistent 
visitors to the market, while the People’s Republic of China, the Malaysian Federation or 
PETRONAS, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Republic of the Philippines are among other 
potential visitors.  
There are also higher rated issuers on the market, but they are essentially accessing the 
market through structured types of bonds, similar to the MTN market.  
For a wider community of issuers, the euroyen format, targeting investors throughout 
international markets through issuance of large internationally liquid issues, still remains 
attractive (while such issuance would not work through the Samurai format in terms of 
flexibility, costs, etc.). Such corporates as GECC and IBM, and the Republic of Italy among 
sovereigns, are most notable issuers on this market. 
Any market has its cycles and, as the Japanese economy is at last showing signs of 
sustainable recovery, Japanese investors have been regaining some of their confidence and 
the international yen market has been gradually improving. Subject to global economic and 
consequent investor liquidity, currency and credit events and other trends, the yen capital 
market may regain some of its prominence in the years to come. 
However, another possible reason for the retreat of the yen market may have been the 
failure to make the yen a truly international currency, and the lack of medium- and long-term 
policy to develop the Japanese domestic bond and euroyen markets into truly competitive 
international markets. Without political and legal commitment from the government, such a 
goal cannot be achieved, and in our view the authorities still have some role to play in the 
further development of Asian bond markets.  BIS Papers No 30  159
 
Annex 1: 
The Japanese market for Asian equities 
While the main focus of this paper is on bonds, the picture of capital flows from Japan to Asia 
will not be complete without briefly mentioning the equity market. If the underlying theme of 
this discussion is the flow of Japanese capital into Asian currencies or Asian credits, then 
while such flow via bonds may have been limited, Japanese investors have made substantial 
investments in Asian equities.  
To briefly recall the history, the opening of the Japanese equity market started around the 
same time as that of the bond market, and in 1972, the first foreign public equity offering in 
Japan was made by a US company, General Telephone and Electronics, while in 1973 the 
first listings on the Tokyo Stock Exchange were made by four US companies joined by their 
French confrère.  
Since then, although there have been ups and downs in the amount and number of 
companies conducting equity financing in Japan or listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the 
Japanese market has over the years made an ample contribution to international and Asian 
equity financing.  
This contribution has been particularly visible in recent cases of major global offerings of 
Chinese companies, on some of which it was reported that they “would not have succeeded 
without the Japanese demand”. What in our view makes them worth mentioning is that 
through these equity purchases Japanese investors have been aggressively investing in 
Asian currencies and Asian corporate credits, implicitly taking Asian sovereign exposure as 
well. 160  BIS Papers No 30
 
Annex 2: 
Issuance in various Japanese yen market segments 
List of Shogun issues 
Launch 
date  Issuer Currency Amount 
(mil)  Coupon Issue 
price  Maturity
Jun-85 EIB  (Shibo)    ECU   50    9.2  99.75   10 
Aug-85 World  Bank    USD    300    10.5  100.000  10 
Aug-85 Sallie  Mae    USD    100    9.75  100.875   5 
Oct-85  Victorian Public Authorities Finance 
Agency   A$   60    13.625  99.875   7 
Oct-85  NSW Treasury Corp   USD    100   10.375  100.875    7 
Oct-85  Bank of China   USD    100   10  100    10 
Nov-85  Southern California Edison Company   USD    100    10.5  100.65    8 
Dec-85 CITIC    USD    100    9.625  100.75  10 
Mar-86 Farm  Credit  Corporation   C$   90    9.125  100.75   5 
May-86  State Bank of NSW   USD    100   7.125  100.9    7 
Jul-86 Hydro  Quebec    C$    150    9.27  100.875    10 
Aug-86  Federal Business Development Bank    C$    75   9  100.95    5 
Sep-86 World  Bank   C$    100    9  100.85  10 
Nov-86  National Bank of Hungary (Shibo)   USD    55   8.875  100    7 
Nov-86  NSW Treasury Corp   USD    100   7.75  101.375    7 
Dec-86 World  Bank    USD    200    7.375  101.125   7 
Jan-87 Standard  Oil    USD   50    7.875  101.375   10 
Feb-87 Ciba  Geigy    USD   50    7.5  101.355   7 
Feb-87 FHLB    USD    200    7.75  101.125  10 
Mar-87 GTE  Finance    USD    100    8  101.3   7 
May-87 Bell  Canada   C$    100    9.875  101.4   9 
Oct-87 Fannie  Mae    USD    200    10.1  100.19    7 
Oct-88 EIB    ECU    100    8  101.875    10 
Oct-88 World  Bank    USD    100    9.04  100    10 
Aug-89  P&O (Shogun CB)   USD    175   6  100    15 
May-91 EIB    ECU    240    9  101.755   8 
Jan-94 HNG    USD   50    5  (A$)  100.6    4 
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List of Daimyo issues 
Launch 
date  Issuer  Amount 
(yen mil)  Coupon Issue 
price  Maturity  Book-
runner 
04/22/87 World  Bank    40,000  4.625  101.000 05/12/97  Daiwa 
05/15/87 World  Bank    40,000  4.250 100.375  06/03/97  Yamaichi 
11/12/87 World  Bank    50,000  5.625  101.125 11/27/97  Nomura 
02/25/88 World  Bank    100,000 5.125  100.250  03/17/98  Nikko 
04/08/88  Inter-American Development Bk   20,000  5.000  100.000  04/14/98  Nikko 
05/27/88 World  Bank    60,000  5.125  100.000 03/17/98  Daiwa 
08/06/88 World  Bank    70,000  5.250 100.500  08/19/98  Yamaichi 
09/08/88 ADB    30,000  5.500  100.250 09/26/98  Nomura 
03/10/89 ADB    40,000  5.500  100.650 03/16/99  Nikko 
04/01/89 ADB    40,000  5.125  100.000 04/14/99  Nomura 
04/10/89  Inter-American Development Bk  25,000  5.125  100.375  04/19/99  Yamaichi 
07/05/89 IFC    20,000  5.375  100.80 07/18/96  Nomura 
09/05/89 World  Bank    70,000 5.250  100.750  09/20/99  IBJ 
10/17/89  Inter-American Development Bk   30,000  5.625  100.80  10/25/99  Nomura 
11/02/89 African  Development  Bank   20,000  5.750  100.30  11/17/99  Nikko 
12/14/89 World  Bank    50,000  5.875 100.750  12/22/94  Yamaichi 
12/21/89 IFC    10,000  7.100  100.80 12/28/94  Nomura 
04/24/90 African  Development  Bank   40,000  7.250  100.500  05/09/97  Daiwa 
06/01/90 IFC    15,000  8.000  100.500 06/14/96  Nomura 
07/11/90 African  Development  Bank   30,000  7.250  100.375  07/16/97  Nomura 
07/22/90 World  Bank    30,000  7.000  95.000 07/30/97  Nomura 
09/18/90 IFC    10,000  8.000  95.000 09/28/00  Yamaichi 
10/19/90 ADB    30,000  7.500  100.500 11/09/00  Daiwa 
12/18/90  Inter-American Development Bk   35,000  7.000  100.750  12/27/00  Daiwa 
04/17/91 African  Development  Bank   40,000  7.250  100.875  04/24/98  Daiwa 
01/23/92 ADB    50,000  5.625  99.60 02/12/02  Yamaichi 
01/31/92  Inter-American Development Bk   50,000  5.375  100.450  02/25/97  Nikko 
06/09/92 African  Development  Bank   40,000  6.200  99.80  06/18/02  Yamaichi 
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List of global yen issues 1992-2003 
Launch 
date  Issuer  Amount 
(yen mil)  Coupon Issue 

















225,000 4.500  99.983 06/20/00 DAIWA-SEC/GS(JB)/IBJ-I(JB) 
01/11/94 Italy  300,000 3.500  99.980 06/20/01 DAIWA-EUR/JPM(JB) 




























50,000 1.000  99.429 12/20/04 MERRILL/NOMURA-SEC(JB) 
11/12/99 General 
Motors Corp 
50,000 1.250  99.72 12/20/04 BEAR/MERRILL(JB) 
11/30/99 Procter  & 
Gamble Co 




50,000 .875 99.604 09/22/03 BOTMI 
01/13/00 OKB  100,000 1.800  99.805 03/22/10 NOMURA 
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List of global yen issues 1992-2003 (cont) 
Launch 
date  Issuer  Amount 
(yen mil) Coupon Issue 
price  Maturity Bookrunner 




100,000  Floats 99.968 02/01/02 DEUTSCHE-ALEX-B 
01/28/00 Ford  Motor 
Credit Co 
100,000 1.200  99.855 02/07/05 GS/MSDW(JB)/BOTMI(JB) 
02/03/00 Mellon  Bank 
NA, 
Pittsburgh, PA 
10,000 1.400  Market 02/24/05 JPM 
02/18/00 Italy  100,000 1.800  99.882 02/23/10 MSDW/NOMURA-SEC(JB) 
03/02/00 McDonald’s 
Corp 
15,000 2.000  99.927 03/09/10 MERRILL/MSDW(JB) 
03/02/00 McDonald’s 
Corp 




100,000 1.750  99.735 03/23/10 JPM/BOT-MITSUBISHI(JB) 




25,000 .875 99.605 09/22/03 NOMURA-SEC-INTL 




50,000 .625 99.840 05/23/03 SALOMON-SMITH 
05/16/00  Procter &  
Gamble Co 
50,000 1.500 100.162 12/07/05 SALOMON-SMITH/BOTMI(JB) 
05/16/00  Procter &  
Gamble Co 
15,000 2.000  99.717 06/21/10 SALOMON-SMITH/BOTMI(JB) 
05/24/00 Province  of 
Ontario 









100,000 1.750  99.634 06/21/10 NOMURA 




9,400 .900  100.000 07/28/03 MSDW 
07/31/00 Italy  50,000  .375 100.095 05/12/02 UBS-WARBURG 
08/21/00 OKB  50,000 1.800  100.702 03/22/10 NOMURA 
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List of global yen issues 1992-2003 (cont) 
Launch 
date  Issuer  Amount 
(yen mil)  Coupon Issue 










20,000 4.200 100.000 03/17/31 ML-I 
03/13/01 Canada  50,000  .700  101.027 03/20/06 NOMURA 
04/26/01 Province  of 
Quebec 
50,000 1.600  99.138 05/09/13 JPM/NOMURA(JB) 
06/01/01 Toyota  Motor 
Credit Corp 
50,000 .750 99.592 06/09/08 DAIWA-SEC/NOMURA(JB) 
06/20/01 GE  Financial 
Assurance 
60,000 1.600  99.793 06/20/11 NIKKO-SSB/MORGAN-
STANLEY(JB) 









6,000 Zero 99.188 03/04/03 BOTMI 
03/21/02 Italy  100,000  .375 99.844 10/10/06 NOMURA 






















75,000 1.050  99.354 06/20/23 NOMURA-SEC/UBS-INV-
BANK(JB) 










5,000  Floats 100.000 12/15/06 MORGAN-STANLEY BIS Papers No 30  165
 
Annex 3: 
Samurai and euroyen defaults 









(%)  Maturity  Bookrunner
14-Oct-00 15-Dec-94  HITIC  A+(JCR) 14.5  5.000 26-Dec-01  Nikko 
Feb-02 26-Jun-96  FIEC  A+(JBRI) 14.0  4.100 24-Jul-06  Yamaichi 
25-Mar-98 10-Jun-97 Peregrine 
Investment 
BBB+(JBRI) 10.0  2.600 30-Jun-00  Nikko 
25-Mar-98 10-Jun-97 Peregrine 
Investment 
BBB+(JBRI) 10.0  6mL+90 20-Jun-00  Nikko 
29-Aug-98 19-Jun-97 Dharmala 
Intiutama Int’l
BBB-(NIS) 15.0  5.450 9-Jul-02  Yamaichi 
14-Oct-00 9-Sep-97  HITIC  A+(JCR) 14.0  3.400 24-Sep-04  Nikko 
20-Dec-03 5-Dec-96  Argentina  B1/BB(M/SP) 50.0 5.000 20-Dec-02  Nikko 
20-Dec-03 2-Dec-99  Argentina B1/BB(M/SP) 20.0  5.400 17-Dec-03 Nikko  SSB 
20-Dec-03 24-May-00 Argentina  B1/BB(M/SP) 60.0 5.125 14-Jun-04  Nomura  / 
Merrill Lynch
20-Dec-03 22-Aug-00 Argentina  B1/BB(M/SP) 61.5 4.850 26-Sep-05  Nomura  / 
Nikko SSB 
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Date  Issuer  Rating  Amount 
(yen bn)
Coupon 
(%)  Maturity  Book-
runner 
20-Dec-03 14-Mar-96  Argentina  B1/BB-(M/SP) 8.0  7.400  4-Apr-06  Yamaichi
20-Dec-03 25-Apr-96 Argentina  B1/BB-(M/SP) 8.0  7.400  25-Apr-06  Nomura 
20-Dec-03 15-May-96  Argentina  B1/BB-(M/SP) 7.0  7.400  15-May-06  Nomura 
20-Dec-03 24-Oct-96 Argentina  B1/BB-(M/SP) 50.0  6.000  24-Mar-05  Nikko 
– 4-Feb-97  Bakrie  Int’l 
Finance 
NR 14.0  0.000  12-Feb-00  Peregrine
20-Feb-02 20-Feb-97  APP  Int’l 
Finance 
Ba3(M) 17.0  4.800  20-Feb-02  NA 
20-Dec-03 30-Apr-97 Argentina  B1/BB(M/SP) 50.0  4.400  27-May-04  Yamaichi
5-Apr-00
1 10-Jun-97  Robinson 
Dept 
NR 6.8  0.000  12-Jun-00  Societe 
Generale 
Asia 
– 11-Aug-97  Sierad 
Produce 
NR 2.0  0.000  15-Aug-00  IBJ 
20-Dec-03 23-Jul-99  Argentina  Ba3/BB(M/SP) 18.0  3.500  11-Aug-09  Daiwa 
24-May-02 24-May-00  Buenos 
Aires 
Province 
B1/BB(M/SP) 3.0  4.250  27-May-03  NSSB 
24-Dec-03 31-May-00  Parmalat 
Fin BV 
NR 30.0  3.650  1-Jun-20  NSSB 
2-Dec-01 8-May-01  Enron  Corp  Baa1/BBB+(M/SP) 25.0 0.520  15-May-02 Merrill 
Lynch 
2-Dec-01 4-Jun-01 Enron  Corp  Baa1/BBB+(M/SP) 40.0 0.000  18-Jun-03 Merrill 
Lynch 
2-Dec-01 4-Jun-01 Enron  Corp  Baa1/BBB+(M/SP) 10.0 0.770  18-Jun-03 Merrill 
Lynch 
2-Dec-01 5-Jun-01 Enron  Corp  Baa1/BBB+(M/SP) 10.0 0.970  18-Jun-04 Merrill 
Lynch 
2-Dec-01 15-Jun-01  Enron  Corp  Baa1/BBB+(M/SP) 20.0 0.493  13-Jun-02 Merrill 
Lynch 
1  Date of bankruptcy 
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Bond structures in the liberalisation of Japan’s capital market: 
from Samurai via Shogun and Daimyo to euro with Uridashi and global 
 
 
1994  Public offering through Uridashi 






2000  Large exchangeable bond issuance 
2001-  Surge in forex (AUD, USD, EUR) 
 Uridashi  issuance 
2002  Issuance:  USD 24.5bn 
: 
. 
:  1970  First Samurai bond 
  ADB yen 6bn 
1972  First sovereign 
 Samurai: 
  Australia yen 10bn 
. 
1979  First corporate 
  Samurai: 




1989 First  structured 
 Samurai  (RDC) 
  Denmark yen 120bn 
. 
1996  Lifting of eligibility 
 criteria 
 Record  Samurai 
 issuance 
 
1997  Asian crisis, first 
 Samurai  default 
. 
2002  Issuance: yen 638bn 
1978 Foreign currency 
 denominated  domestic
 bonds  allowed 
 
1985 First Shogun bond: 
  Forex bond fully placed





1993 Last Shogun 
1977 First Euroyenbond (EIB) 
  Euroyen: Euromarket yen 
 denominated  bonds 
  Heavily controlled issuance until 1983
1984 Broad deregulation 
. 
  Further gradual liberation of issuer
  criteria, domestic placement, 














2002 Issuance: yen 2,251bn 
1987-92  Daimyo bonds 
Domestic yen bonds 
with euro settlement 
1990  First global bond ($) 
  with Japanese offering 
 
1992  First global yen bond: 
  Global syndication and 
  simultaneous offering in 
  Japan, US and Euro 





2002 Issuance:  yen  556bn 
 
 